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A. INTRODUCTION 
Violation of sepulchres is a common law crime in Scotland.1 The essence of this crime is the 
occurrence of some unauthorised and irreverent interference with a corpse which has been 
buried or otherwise entombed.2 The crime penalises all unlawful interference with interred 
cadavers,3 from gross abuse of the body once it has been dug up,4 to very mild or slight 
disturbance of the body while it remains in its grave.5 Consequently, the human corpse, while 
it is buried, is not subject to the ordinary laws of property and does not benefit from the ordinary 
legal protection offered to the integrity of proprietary rights.6 The nature of the crime of 
violation of sepulchres is such that the unauthorised removal and carrying-off7 of a cadaver 
from its resting place will not amount to the crime of theft,8 but will rather be tried as this 
distinct crime.9  
Unlike in England, wherein there is a long-established general rule precluding the 
existence of ‘property’ in corpses10 (whether buried11 or unburied),12 there is significant 
                                                          
1 David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes, Vol. I, 4th Edition by B.R Bell 
(Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1844), p.85; Archibald J. Alison, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland, Vol. 
I, (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1832), p.280; Dewar v H.M Advocate 1945 J.C 5, p.11. The Burial and 
Cremation (Scotland) Act 2016 did not alter the common law in regard to this matter. 
2 Gerald H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, Vol. II 4th Edition by James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick 
(Edinburgh: W. Green, 2017) para.51.01 
3 HM Advocate v Coutts (1899) 3 Adam 50 
4 See Youths guilty of ancient grave violation charges, The Scotsman, 27th March 2004 
5 See John H. A. MacDonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th Edition by Lord Walker 
and D. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1948), p.52 
6 Dewar v H.M Advocate 1945 J.C 5, p.11 
7 In modern terms, the appropriation of: The mens rea of theft. For a case involving the carrying-off of a cadaver, 
see HM Advocate v Samuel (1742) MacLaurin Criminal Cases Reports 662 
8 William Bell, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland: With Short Explanations of the Most Ordinary 
English Law Terms. To which is Added a Supplement, Containing an Analysis of the Court of Session Act, the 
Advocation and Suspension Act, the Diligence Act, and the Entail Excambion Act, (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 
1838), p.254 
9 Bell, Dictionary, p.899 
10 Though it is now recognised that parts of human bodies may be stolen where such body parts have been 
subjected to ‘human work or skill: See R v Kelly [1999] Q.B. 621 
11 R v Sharpe [1857] Dearsly and Bell 160 
12 Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch. D. 659; R v Kelly[1999] Q.B. 621 
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Scottish authority to suggest that, in this jurisdiction, corpses can be the subject of theft,13 
provided that the corpse is appropriated prior to its burial.14 As can be inferred from the fact 
that the courts of England and Wales – and, indeed, the wider Common law world – have been 
forced to employ ‘creative judicial reasoning’ to escape from some of the more absurd 
consequences of the ‘no property in a corpse’ rule,15 the position ostensibly adopted by Scots 
law is preferable.16 There are a number of good reasons for treating unburied bodies as capable 
of being owned, not as an exception, but as a rule, not least to protect the interests of 
laboratories in respect of tissue samples and museums in respect of exhibits.17  
With this in mind, it is notable that the reason why, precisely, a cadaver ceases to exist 
within the ambit of property law once interred is presently under-theorised. Indeed, while it 
now appears settled that a corpse can be stolen prior to burial, but not once it has been interred,18 
it has been noted that the law is silent on the subject of the lawfully exhumed cadaver.19 It is 
not yet known if a corpse which had, at one time, been buried but has since been lawfully 
removed from its grave remains nullius in bonis20 and thus incapable of being stolen, or if, in 
such circumstances, it becomes subject to ordinary property law once more.21 Leverick and 
Chalmers suggest two possibilities: Either the body is completely removed from the auspices 
                                                          
13 Hume, Commentaries, Vol. I, (4th Edition), p.85; Alison, Principles, Vol. I, p.280; John H. A. MacDonald, A 
Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1867), p.21; Gordon, Criminal 
Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26; M’Kenzie (1733) reported in (1899) 3 Adam 57n; Dewar v HMA (1945) 
J.C. 5 
14 See Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26 
15 See Imogen Goold and Murieann Quigley, Human Biomaterials: The Case for a Property Approach, in Imogen 
Goold, Kate Greasley, Jonathan Herring and Loane Skene, Persons, Parts and Property: How Should We Regulate 
Human Tissue in the 21st Century?, (Hart, 2014), pp.237-245 
16 James Edelman, Property Rights to our Bodies and to their Products, Plenary presentation at the Australian 
Association of Bioethics and Health Law Conference, 3 October 2014, p.17 
17 Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26; Edelman, Property Rights to our Bodies, p.17 
18 Dewar v H.M Advocate 1945 J.C 5 
19 Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26 
20 To use the words of the English jurist Coke: See Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of 
England: Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes, (London: Printed by 
M. Flesher, for W. Lee, and D. Pakeman, 1644), p.203 
21 Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26 
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of ‘property’ after burial, or after burial the ownership of the corpse falls to the Crown due to 
its earlier ‘abandonment’ in the grave. 22  Neither of these two suggestions are satisfactory and 
so it is submitted that a re-analysis of this area of law is warranted. 
This article suggests a third possible explanation for the present state of affairs: It is 
submitted that a res religiosa – an object not subject to the ordinary rules of property – is 
created, in law, when a body is placed to rest in a grave.23 This suggestion draws on the historic 
connection between the contemporary crime of violation of sepulchres and the Roman crimen 
violati sepulcri.24 The article expounds the reason for the Roman law’s treatment of interred 
cadavers as res divini iuris – things consigned to divine law – and posits that, notwithstanding 
the fact that post-Reformation Scots law was generally reluctant to recognise the existence of 
consecrated or ‘sacred’ grave-sites,25 the concept of res religiosae was nevertheless received 
into Scotland by dint of the evolution of the crimen violati sepulcri. If this is indeed the case, 
then it follows that a lawfully exhumed cadaver may, again, become the subject of theft, since 
the constitutive elements of any res religiosa return to their profane state in circumstances in 
which the body is separated from the grave-site.26  
 
 
                                                          
22 Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26 
23 The burial need not necessary be a religious one in order to realise the creation of a res religiosa. As discussed 
infra, every citizen has the potential to create a res religiosa under certain conditions and there is no need for 
religious official to set the creation of the res religiosa in motion. Thus, in spite of the religious overtone of the 
term ‘res religiosae’, it is submitted that wholly secular (or, indeed, Humanist) funerals in which a body is interred 
with sufficient solemnity effects the creation of a res religiosa, for those reasons which are expounded during the 
course of this article. 
24 See HM Advocate v Samuel (1742) MacLaurin Criminal Cases Reports 662, wherein the charge libelled was 
one of crimen violati sepulcri, and HM Advocate v Coutts (1899) 3 Adam 50 wherein the phrase crimen violati 
sepulcri was used as a keyword. 
25 Peter C. Jupp, Douglas J. Davies, Hilary J. Grainger, Gordon D. Raeburn and Stephen R. G. White, Cremation 
in Modern Scotland: History, Architecture and the Law, (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2017), p.10 
26 James Rives, Control of the Sacred in Roman Law, in Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Ed.), Law and Religion in the 
Roman Republic, (BRILL, 2011), p.172 
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B. ROMAN LAW 
(1) The Roman Crimen Violati Sepulcri 
Roman private law was divided, by Gaius and Justinian, under three distinct headings. In their 
respective Institutes, each jurist stated that ‘omne autem ius quo utimur vel ad personas pertinet 
vel ad res vel ad actiones’27 – all the law that we make use of has reference either to persons 
or to things or to actions. This tripartite division of law proved extremely influential; the later 
ius commune jurists and Scottish institutional writers employed and expanded upon it,28 
ultimately developing the division of private law into four categories of persons, property, 
actions and obligations.29 This four-way division retains relevance in modern mixed and 
Civilian legal systems in the present day.30 
As might be inferred from the evolution of the original tripartite division into a 
quadripartite division, and from the nature of that later division itself, the Roman ius quod ad 
res pertinet encompassed not only what would now be termed the law of ‘property’,31 but 
extended to cover what would now be understood as the law of ‘obligations’ as well.32 The 
Latin word ‘res’ itself must consequently be understood as meaning ‘thing’33 (or, indeed, 
‘things’, as res is both the nominative singular and the nominative plural) in preference to 
‘property’ in translation, in spite of some claims that the word ‘thing’ is too ‘undignified’ a 
                                                          
27 Gai Institutionum Commentarii Quattuor, Commentarius I, 8; Justinian, Institute, Book I, Title II, para.12 
28 Kenneth Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, (Edinburgh: Butterworth, 1993), pp.1-2 
29 James Viscount of Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland: Deduced from its Originals, and Collated with 
the Civil, Canon, and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations: In IV Books, (2nd Edition) 
(Edinburgh: 1693); see also the order of the lectures of Baron David Hume who, though critical of the Romanistic 
divisione, nevertheless made liberal use of it. The division remains of relevance in the 21st century: s.126 (4) of 
the Scotland Act 1998 defines ‘private law’ as the law of persons, obligations, property and actions. 
30 Reid, Property, pp.1-2 
31 See George Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, (Berlin: Springer, 2012) p.119; Rudolph Sohm, 
James Crawford Ledlie, Bernhard Erwin Grueber, The Institutes of Roman Law, (Gorgias Press, 2002) p.225 
32 John Chisholm, Green’s Encyclopaedia of the Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1898), p.309 
33 William W. Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1936) p.91 
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term to describe such an important area of law.34 Undignified and mercurial though the word 
may be,35 the use of this term allows for the most apposite interpretation of the Roman law as 
it pertains to res and, indeed, the mercurial nature of the English language understanding of the 
word ‘things’ reflects the ‘elusive’36 and indefinite nature of the word res itself.37 
Res were, themselves, divided into two discrete sub-categories; the Roman jurists 
recognised the import and existence of both res corporales – corporeal things – and res 
incorporales – incorporeal things.38 Although some later commentators suggested that the 
jurists had only corporeal things in mind when considering the ius quod ad res pertinet,39 such 
a suggestion can be shown to be false by reference to the nature of the word ‘res’ as it is used 
in the context of the Gaian and Justinianic division of things.40 The res incorporales are 
explicitly listed as types of juristic things created by law to be amenable to ‘ownership’ and 
thus it can be inferred that just as one might exercise dominium in respect of a res corporalis, 
so too might one exercise the same in respect of a res incorporalis.41  
The claim that the word ‘res, in Roman law, denoted anything that could form part of 
a person’s property’42 can, however, also be shown to be false, again by reference to the 
original Roman sources. In their respective Institutes, the Roman jurists divided the ius quod 
                                                          
34 Reid, Property, para.3; as Professor Reid notes, the Germans and South Africans explicitly refer to the law of 
moveable property as ‘thing-law’, speaking of Sachenrecht (in German) and Sakereg (in Afrikaans) respectively.  
35 Indeed, even the narrower term ‘property’ is subject to a ‘bewildering variety of uses’ – see George W. Paton 
and David P. Derham, A Text-book of Jurisprudence, (4th Edition) (Oxford University Press, 1972) p.505 
36 To use the words of Professor Nicholas: Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1962) p.98 
37 A. M. Prichard, Leage’s Roman Private Law, (3rd Edition) (MacMillan and Co., 1961) p.151 
38 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 8; Justinian, Institutes, 2, 2, 12 
39 Buckland, Institutions, p.91; Sohm et al, Institutes, p.225. 
40 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 8; Justinian, Institutes, 2, 2, 12 
41 Dominium itself was not a right, nor a res incorporalis; rather, it described the relationship between the persona 
and the res: See the discussion in Jonathan Brown, Plagium: An Archaic and Anomalous Crime, [2016] Jur. Rev. 
129, pp.132-133 
42 Green’s Encyclopaedia  (1st Ed.), p.309 
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ad res pertinet into the law as it pertains to res humani iuris and res divini iuris.43 Only things 
which fell into the former category could legally form a part of the patrimony of a legal 
person,44 thus the divide is described as being one between res in nostro patrimonio – things 
which may be owned – and res extra nostrum patrimonium – those which may not.45 
Gaius himself considered the separation of res divini iuris and res humani iuris to be 
the fundamental division of things, notwithstanding the fact that later jurists would consider 
his division between the res corporales and res incorporales to be of greater significance.46 At 
the outset of Liber II, the jurist explicitly noted two species of res divini iuris – res sacrae and 
res religiosae47 – before going on to state that certain things – the res sanctae – also fell to be 
considered under this heading due to their important societal function.48 Res Sacrae were 
‘sacred things’ created when an object was ex auctoritate populi Romani consecratum est – 
consecrated as such by the authority of the Roman people.49  Res religiosae were dead bodies 
which had been ‘relinquished to the gods’50 – that is to say, corpses which had been 
reverentially buried.51 Gaius emphasises that res religiosae are created by the act of burying 
the dead in land owned by the burier or land in which the burier was authorised to place the 
body to rest.52 Unlike res sacrae, which depended, for their existence, upon an act of 
                                                          
43 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 2 
44 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 9 
45 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 1-9 
46 Indeed, this division has been referred to as the ‘Gaian Schema’ by Gretton and others: George Gretton, 
Ownership and its Objects, [2007] Rabels Zeitschrift Vol 71 803, p.805; Francesco Giglio, Pandectism and the 
Gaian Classification of Things, [2012] University of Toronto Law Journal 1 
47 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 3 
48 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 8; such things included the city walls and the gates – Justinian notes that the term ‘sanction’ 
derives from the penalty for interference with such objects, since one who tampered with the res sanctae could 
incur capital punishment: Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.8 
49 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 5 
50 Religiosae, quae diis manibus relictae sunt: Gaius, Institutes, 2, 4; Rives notes that, ostensibly, ‘the imperial 
jurists regarded graves as the only type of res religiosa’ – see Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.172 
51 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 6 
52 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 6 
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consecration from the church or state authority,53 or the res sanctae, which were protected by 
divine sanction due to their secular importance,54 the creation of res religiosae did not require 
the presence of a priest or the authority or sanction of the state.55 
The fact that res religiosae could be created by any private citizen56 had the potential 
to undermine the law of private property.57 While the Republican jurists did not appear overly 
concerned with this potential issue,58 perhaps because interference with grave-sites carried no 
secular penalty59 and lawyers of that time period were content to leave the gods to take care of 
their own affairs,60 by the time of Justinian, the creation of res religiosae was regulated rather 
more strictly.61 Justinian maintained that, while anyone could create a res religiosa,62 the body 
must either be interred in land owned by the burier, or in land co-owned by the burier with 
common consent of all co-owners (unless the land was previously used for sepulchre).63 A res 
religiosa could be created if the body was buried in land owned by another, or in land in which 
another enjoyed usufructus, but only in circumstances in which the other owner or holder of 
usufructus consented.64 
                                                          
53 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 5 
54 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 8 
55 Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.173 
56 See Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.9: ‘Religiosum locum unusquisque sua voluntate facit, dum 
mortuum infert in locum suum’ – everyone can make a place religious by their own volition, by interring a dead 
body in their land.  
57 See Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.172 
58 Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.172 
59 Aside from a potential actio in factum: Dig. 43.6.1; Dig. 47.12.3 
60 I. M. J. Valeton, De Templis Romanis, [1893] Mnemosyne 338, pp.345-349 
61 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.9 
62 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.9 
63 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.9 
64 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.9; the same logic applied in respect of burial in land over which another 
possessed a servitude – Dig. 11.7.2.7-8 – or a conditional legacy – Dig. 11.7.34 
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It is notable that, though the distinction between res mobiles and res immobiles was of 
limited significance in Roman law,65 particularly when one considers the importance of this 
divide in later legal thought,66 res religiosae were exclusively immobilis in the post-Republican 
era.67 The cadaver was not, itself, a res religiosa,68 nor was any place in which the corpse was 
stored prior to or in preparation for burial.69 The act of interment initiated the process of the 
creation of the res religiosa; the land itself – the locus religiosus – when combined with the 
presence of the body, became the res religiosa.70 If the body were removed from the locus, the 
res religiosa would cease to exist and the constituent parts of that thing would return to their 
previously profane state.71 
 The process by which the previously profane land and body ceased to exist as distinct 
objects under the humani iuris and became, instead, a single res religiosa governed by divine 
law is not clear. The sources do not offer much in the way of guidance in the event of this 
specific scenario. It is submitted, however, that, as the general principles of Roman property 
law do recognise that two (or more) objects may combine to make a new thing,72 the ordinary 
rules of the ius quod ad res pertinet may be employed in order to explain the creation of res 
religiosae. Extant res divini iuris may be outwith the realm of ordinary property law, but until 
                                                          
65 William Gordon, Roman Law in Scotland, in Robin Evans-Jones, The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, (The 
Stair Society: Edinburgh, 1995), p.19 
66 David L. Carey Miller and David Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (W. Green and Sons, 2005), 
para.1.03 
67 Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.172 
68 Naturally in a legal system which condoned slavery, human bodies had the potential to be res in commercio: 
See Brown, Plagium, p.133. Both Gaius and Justinian indicate that the human body is a quintessential example 
of a res corporalis: Gaius, Institutes, 2, 8; Justinian, Institutes, 2, 2, 12 
69 Cicero, De Legibus, 2.57 
70 As discussed, infra, it may be inferred that this change of character is effected by dint of accession.  
71 Dig. 11.7.44 
72 By way of, for example, accessio or specificatio: See Cornelius van der Merwe, Nova Species, [2004] Roman 
Legal Tradition 
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such an object exists juridically, its component parts are nevertheless governed by the humani 
iuris. 
The principles of accessio may, therefore, provide appropriate guidance as to how, 
precisely, a res religiosa could be said to be created by the act of burying a cadaver. Accessio 
was a mode of original acquisition whereby an object – the accessory – accedes to a larger 
object – the principal – and so becomes part of that larger object.73 There were a number of 
ways in which accessio could be effected,74 most relevant to the present discussion is the 
process of inaedificatio.75 The quintessential example of accessio by way of inaedificatio is 
the fixture of some moveable property to an immoveable piece of land or a building.76 As a 
result of the maxim omne quod inaedificatio solo cedit – all that is built on soil accedes to the 
soil – any res mobilis which is affixed to land becomes the property of the owner of the res 
immobilis,77 even if the owner of the res immobilis had no connection to the party who built on 
their land.78 As the creation of a res religiosa necessarily involved the placing of a res mobilis 
into res immobilis, and as the locus religiosus was, when combined with the interred body, the 
res religiosa itself, it might be inferred that the burial of a corpse stands as an example of 
accessio by way of inaedificatio as the corpse, in being interred, accedes to the land in which 
it is buried.  
With the principal and the accessory thus combined, the res religiosae is thus created 
and consequently, in spite of the principle that the owner of the solum becomes owner of the 
                                                          
73 Barry Nicholas, Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford: OUP, 1962), p.133; L. P. W. van Vliet, Accession of 
Moveables to Land: I, [2003] Edin. L. R. 67, p.67 
74 See Robert D. Melville, A Manual of the Principles of Roman Law Relating to Persons, Property, and 
Obligations, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1915), p.222 
75 The accession of moveable fixtures to immoveable property: Nhlanhla Lucky Sono, Development of the Law 
Regarding Inaedificatio: A Constitutional Analysis, [2014] Stellenbosch University: LLM Thesis, para.2.2  
76 See Melville, Manual, p.223 
77 William W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, (Cambridge: CUP, 1921), p.212 
78 R. W. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law with a Translation of the Institutes of Justinian, (4th ed.) (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1986), p.133 
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newly acceded accessory,79 the grave-site moves outside of the realm of private property law. 
The need for the land to be owned by the burier, or for the burial to take place only with the 
consent of the landowner, in order to create a validly constituted res religiosa is thus explained. 
The principles of inaedificatio explain how the character of the corpse and grave-site are 
changed when they are combine; the consistent requirement for the consent of the landowner 
to the interment allows for the alienation of the object from the general laws of property.80 
Just as the conditions under which a res religiosa could be created were stricter by 
Justinian’s time, so too were the penalties for interference with such things more severe.81 In 
the post-classical period, the crimen violati sepulcri outlawed any act which interfered with a 
properly constituted res religiosa;82 such things, being extra nostrum patrimonium, could not 
be the object of furtum, or ‘theft’.83 Indeed, it is notable that while furtum was, in Roman law, 
a delictum which conferred a right of action only on the persona who suffered loss as a result 
of the theft,84 the crimen violati sepulcri was a penal actio popularis,85 meaning that any Roman 
citizen could seek to prosecute a purported culprit for their commission of this wrong.86 In any 
event, the individual who exercised ius sepulcri – legal authority over the grave-site – could 
sue a wrongdoer by means of an actio violati sepulcri.87 
The crimen violati sepulcri served to protect the grave-site from any unauthorised 
interference, differentiating between two primary types of interference: Violati minor and 
                                                          
79 Buckland, Textbook, p.212 
80 It is pertinent that, for Gaius, only the consent of the landowner was needed for the creation of the res religiosa; 
Gaius, Institutes, 2, 6; Justinian’s requirement for the consent of those with other proprietary interests in the land 
is a later development: Justinian, Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.172 
81 Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.172 
82 Adolf Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Roman Law, Vol.43 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical 
Society, 1953), p.767 
83 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.480 
84 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.480; Rives, Control of the Sacred, pp.170-172 
85 See Dig.47.12, Cod.9.19 
86 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.767 
87 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.767 
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violati maior (minor and major violations, respectively). The former were such violations 
which involved tampering with the locus religiosus;88 these were punishable by fine (of up to 
100,000 sesterces) or infamia89 – the removal of the privileges of Roman citizenship.90 
Disinterring the cadaver and carrying it off was considered a violati maior and punishable by 
death.91 
The Roman crimen violati sepulcri is the progenitor of the modern Scottish crime of 
violation of sepulchres.92 The Roman principles pertinent to the law of accessio were similarly 
received into Scots law.93 For these reasons, it is submitted that, in recognition of the fact that 
the law of Scotland is silent as to whether or not exhumed cadavers may be ‘stolen’,94 reference 
ought to be made to the fundamental principles of Roman law which justify the existence of 
the special protection offered in respect of grave-sites and interred dead bodies. It is noted that 
even Hume, who is otherwise sceptical of the continuing authority of Roman law in Scotland,95 
recognised that the principles of Civilian jurisprudence may be invoked in instances such as 
this.96 
 
 
 
                                                          
88 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.767 
89 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.767 
90 Thomas A. J. McGinn, Prostitution, Sexuality and the Law in Ancient Rome, (Oxford: OUP, 1998), p.65 
91 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.767 
92 Sheila Livingstone, Confess and be Hanged: Scottish Crime and Punishment Through the Ages, (Edinburgh, 
Luckin, 2000), p.24 
93 Stair Institutions II, I, II. See further Reid, Property, paras.11-14 
94 Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26 
95 Grant McLeod, The Romanization of Property Law, in Kenneth G. C. Reid and Reinhard Zimmermann, A 
History of Private Law in Scotland, Vol. I (Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.240 
96 Hume, Lectures, Vol. I, p.2 
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C. SCOTS LAW 
(1) Scots Law and the Crimen Violati Sepulcri 
It is clear that the modern Scottish crime of violation of sepulchres is fundamentally Roman in 
origin. In those cases which directly concerned charges of the crime, the courts referred directly 
to the charge as being one of crimen violati sepulcri97 and those commentators who first 
deigned to comment on its operation in Scots law described it as such in their textbooks.98 
Naturally, ‘the use of Roman terminology alone does not necessarily indicate the adoption of 
a Roman institution’,99 however ‘it is still possible to trace the influence of Roman law on many 
branches of Scots law’100 and it is evident that the crime of violation of sepulchres is one such 
area in which Roman law acutely affected the development of Scottish jurisprudence. Thus, in 
spite of the claim that, after the Reformation, the Scottish courts ‘refused to recognise any 
burial space as res religiosa’,101 it is evident that the grave-site is nevertheless recognised as 
an object of significance in modern criminal law. 
While it is certainly true that Scots law has never treated burial grounds as completely 
beyond the bounds of property or commerce,102 as Roman law did,103 and so the extent to which 
the notion of res religiosae was received into Scotland may be questioned,104 it is likewise clear 
                                                          
97 HM Advocate v Weir (1710) (1899) 3 Adam 55n; HM Advocate v Samuel (1742) MacLaurin Criminal Cases 
Reports 662; Begg v HM Advocate (1803) Hume Vol. I sup. 23; HM Advocate v Pattison (1814) Hume Vol. I sup. 
23; HM Advocate v Coutts (1899) 3 Adam 50. The most recent case concerning violation of sepulchres occurred 
in 2004 (Youths guilty of ancient grave violation charges, The Scotsman, 27th March 2004) but this case was not 
reported: Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.51.01, note 3. 
98 John Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland in the Order of Sir George MacKenzie’s Institutions of that 
Law, (3rd Edition) (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1809), p.513; Alison, Principles, Vol. I, p.461. It should be 
noted that MacKenzie did not deign to comment on the crime of violation of sepulchres in his Matters Criminal. 
99 T. D. Fergus, Sources of Law (General and Historical): The Historical Sources of Scots Law (1) Roman Law, 
in The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol.22 (LexisNexis, 1986) para.556;  
100 Fergus, Sources, para.556 
101 Jupp et al, Cremation, p.10 
102 Jupp et al, Cremation, p.24 
103 Dig 1.8.6.4; Dig. 11.7.2.7; Dig 11.7.2.8; Dig. 11.7.34 
104 John M. Duncan, Treatise on the Parochial Ecclesiastical Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 
1864), p.220 
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that the differentiation of res extra commercium and res in commercio (things beyond and 
within the remit of commerce, respectively) has been received into Scots law.105 Similarly, a 
discussion of the separation of res in nostro patrimonio and res extra nostrum patrimonium 
features extensively in Green’s Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland106 and, in addition, it 
appears that Scots law has consistently recognised two principles ‘which operate to exclude 
churchyards to a great extent from being dealt with as subjects to which the ordinary rights 
and privileges of proprietorship belong.’107 The first such principle is concerned, like the 
Roman law, with the religious character imparted upon the ground by its having been set aside 
for an exclusive and hallowed purpose108 (though, speaking in the context of Scots law, both 
Duncan and Johnston refers to this as but a ‘quasi-religious character’).109 The second 
principle is concerned with ensuring that the benefit of the churchyard, in respect of the 
community that the parish is intended to serve, is secured.110  
On a Romanistic analysis, these two distinct principles would appear to indicate that 
the character of a grave-site, as a sepulchre, is protected as a hybrid of a res sacrae, res 
religiosae and a res sanctae.111 Res sacrae received their special character – their status as 
things excluded from the law of private property – by dint of their having been consecrated by 
a priest;112 indeed, the res sacrae itself was created by the occurrence of such consecration.113 
As emphasised in the previous section, res religiosae could be created by anyone – there was 
no need for the creator of a res religiosae to possess any religious character, any legal persona 
                                                          
105 Presbytery of Edinburgh v University of Edinburgh 1890, 28 S.L. Rep. 567 
106 John Chisholm, Green’s Encyclopaedia of the Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1898), pp.309-311 
107 Christopher N. Johnston, The Parochial Ecclesiastical Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1903) 
pp.208-209 
108 Rives, Control of the Sacred, p.171-172 
109 Duncan, Treatise, p.705; Johnston, Ecclesiastical Law, p.209 
110 Johnston, Ecclesiastical Law, p.209 
111 Indeed, Duncan notes the similarities between these three concepts: See Duncan, Treatise, p.705 
112 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.8 
113 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.8 
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could create such an object by interring a corpse in land that they owned.114 Res sanctae were 
those objects that held such significance to the community that interference with them was 
‘sanctioned’ by capital punishment.115  
It is apparent that the burial of a corpse in a churchyard may be said to invoke the 
characteristics of all three types of those things consigned to the divini iuris.  The burial of the 
cadaver indicates that the burial ground, once the corpse is interred, may be considered a res 
religiosa;116 the fact of the burial occurring in consecrated ground suggests that the land is res 
sacrae;117 the importance of the churchyard to the community as a whole ultimately suggests 
that the land is res sanctae.118 While the elements of res religiosa and res sanctae may be said 
to operate in respect of private cemeteries and other such graveyards which are situated away 
from the locus of the church, due to the burial of corpses therein and the importance of the 
service provided to the community as a whole, it is apparent that such cemeteries are not 
consecrated ground119 and so graves situated in private cemeteries could not be considered res 
sacrae in the absence of official consecration. 
In claiming that the law of Scotland refused to recognise the existence of res religiosa 
after the Reformation,120 it would appear that Jupp, Douglas, Davies, Grainger, Raeburn and 
White have erroneously conflated the concept of res religiosae with the similar and related, but 
distinct conceptions of res sacrae and res sanctae. Indeed, the authors posit that an ‘important 
aspect of the removal of burial locations from the kirks in the towns and cities was that these 
new spaces should not be consecrated or considered ‘sacred’.’121 Thereafter, they go on to 
                                                          
114 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.8 
115 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.8 
116 Dig. 11.7.44 
117 Consistent with Johnston’s first principle: Johnston, Ecclesiastical Law, p.209 
118 Consistent with Johnston’s second principle: Johnston, Ecclesiastical Law, p.209 
119 Jupp et al, Cremation, p.10 
120 Jupp et al, Cremation, p.10 
121 Jupp et al, Cremation, p.10 
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note the reluctance of the law to recognise what would be considered res religiosa,122 citing 
the work of Houston.123 For his part, Houston makes reference to Duncan’s Treatise of the 
Parochial Ecclesiastical Law of Scotland, but Duncan himself confines his discussion to res 
sacrae and res sanctae, noting only that ‘the phrase res religiosae is frequently employed as a 
generic term inclusive of both descriptions of subjects, is not unfrequently used as synonymous 
with either.’124  
Duncan’s view that ‘churchyards do not strictly fall within the definition of property 
included under either category [res sacrae or res sanctae]’125 consequently has no bearing on 
the recognition, or otherwise, extended to the res religiosae in Scots law. As such, Houston’s 
claim that ‘post‐Reformation Scots law was different from Roman in refusing to recognize any 
burial place as res religiosa’,126 and the authors of Cremation in Modern Scotland’s founding 
on Houston’s claim,127 rests on a faulty basis. Duncan makes no such claim and no other 
authority is cited in support of this proposition. The lack of official sacrosanctity may preclude 
the existence of res sacrae,128 and the lack of explicit state sanction may preclude the existence 
of res sanctae,129 but as noted in relation to the relevant Roman law, official sanction or 
consecration is not required to constitute the creation of a res religiosa.130 
The claim that the burial of the cadaver simpliciter creates a res religiosa is consistent 
with post-Reformation Canon law, as expressed by the English jurist Thomas Wood: 
                                                          
122 Jupp et al, Cremation, p.10 
123 R. A. Houston, Punishing the Dead?: Suicide, Lordship, and Community in Britain, 1500-1830, (Oxford: OUP, 
2010) 
124 Duncan, Treatise, p.705 
125 Duncan, Treatise, p.705 
126 R. A. Houston, Punishing the Dead?: Suicide, Lordship, and Community in Britain, 1500-1830, (Oxford: OUP, 
2010) 
127 Jupp et al, Cremation, p.10 
128 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.8 
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“Res Religiosae, or religious things, are those places into which the body, or 
principal part of the body such as the head, bones or ashes of a dead man, are brought to be 
perpetually buried there by him that has a right to bury in that place. Every private person 
may make a religious place by his own authority, provided he has the whole right of ground 
in himself, or leave from the lawful owner. ” 131 
It is consequently submitted that the existence, and status, of the crime of violation of 
sepulchres as a distinct crime is itself evidence that the common law of Scotland recognises 
the existence of res religiosae. As a result of the notable distinction between the criminal 
treatment of plain theft of an unburied corpse and the rather more serious treatment of criminals 
who violate sepulchres,132 it may be inferred that Scots law acknowledges the importance of 
the burial of the cadaver133 – the salient element of the creation of any res religiosa – even if 
modern Scots law does not recognise either res sacrae or res sanctae. By drawing on the 
Roman crimen violati sepulcri to offer this enhanced protection, Scots law has implicitly 
recognised – and continues to recognise – the existence of res religiosae. Just as in Roman law, 
such Scottish res religiosae are not confined to the sanctified grounds of a church, but rather 
exist in any instance in which a body is properly placed to rest in such a manner so as to create 
a sepulchre worthy of specific legal protection.134 
That the law relating to res religiosa in the Roman law and Canon law sources is 
consistent with the operation of Scots law in respect of the crime of violation of sepulchres is 
evident in the judgement of H.M Advocate v Coutts.135 Therein, Lord MacLaren held that, at 
                                                          
131 Thomas Wood, The New Institute of Imperial of Civil Law, Shewing in Some Principal Cases Amongst Other 
Observations, How the Canon Law, the Laws of England and the Laws and Customs of Other Nations Differs 
From It, Book II (London: Richard Sarf, 1704), p.86  
132 The maximum penalty attached to the crime of violation of sepulchres is presently life imprisonment: BBC 
News, Teenagers Deny Violating Corpse, (24th March 2004) 
133 See Dewar v HM Advocate 1945 J.C 5, pp.11-14 
134 Justinian, Institute, Book. II, Title I, para.9 
135 (1899) 3 Adam 50 
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least insofar as the crime of violation of sepulchres is concerned, ‘the law recognises no 
distinction between public and private cemeteries’.136 The protection offered to sepulchres 
evidently rests not on the two principles ‘which operate to exclude churchyards to a great 
extent from being dealt with as subjects to which the ordinary rights and privileges of 
proprietorship belong’,137 but rather on the principles which act to exclude sepulchres 
simpliciter from those rules of property. Although Dewar v HM Advocate138 was not, itself, 
concerned with the crime of violation of sepulchres, some obiter remarks made therein suggest 
further consistency between the Romanistic notion of the crimen violati sepulcri and the Scots 
crime of violation of sepulchres. In Dewar, Lord Moncrieff noted that it is ‘when a step has 
conclusively been taken to set agoing the process of dissolution of the bodies of the dead that 
the law ceases to protect the body from acts of theft’.139 Similarly, Lord Normand held that ‘it 
is not until the ashes are interred or disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the relatives 
that the crime of violation of sepulchres can take place’.140 These dicta imply that the crime of 
violation of sepulchres contemporaneously exists to protect the place in which the body is 
interred – or otherwise laid to rest – rather than the human corpse alone; thus, as such protection 
is consistent with the protection offered to res religiosae, it may be inferred that Scotland 
recognises res religiosae for the purposes of the criminal law.  
Although res religiosae are res extra nostrum patrimonium, and so implicitly 
‘ownerless’, it was held in HM Advocate v Weir141 that the ‘owner’ of the churchyard from 
which bodies were disinterred could not be convicted of the crime of violation of sepulchres. 
This is not fatal to the claim that the law of Scotland implicitly recognises res religiosae, 
                                                          
136 (1899) 3 Adam 50, p.61 
137 Johnston, Ecclesiastical Law, pp.208-209 
138 1945 J.C 5 
139 Dewar v HM Advocate 1945 J.C 5, p.14 
140 Dewar v HM Advocate 1945 J.C 5, p.11 
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however; as noted above, in Roman law, certain individuals could exercise ius sepulcri in 
respect of grave-sites.142 Since Weir enjoyed ownership of the ‘place of the church from which 
the said dead bodies were lifted’143 – it can be implied that he enjoyed ius sepulcri in respect 
of them.144 This ius sepulcri allowed him to exhume the bodies, on the grounds that the crime 
of violation of sepulchres applies in respect of the unauthorised interference with grave-sites 
only. Weir’s actions were, thus, implicitly authorised, since he was the sole source of authority 
in respect of the res religiosa.  
As in Roman law, the res religiosa may be said to come into existence by way of 
accessio. The Scots law of moveable property remains ‘resolutely Civilian in character’,145 
although even in this ‘heavily Romanized’ area146 Roman law was not ‘received completely 
unaltered into Scots law’.147 The doctrine of accessio – anglicised as accession – does, 
however, operate, in this jurisdiction, in much the same way as the doctrine operated in the 
Roman law.148 Just as inaedificatio ensured that omne quod inaedificatio solo cedit in Roman 
law, so too is it ‘well established in Scots law that a corporeal moveable attached to land or 
buildings becomes annexed to the immoveable property and therefore belongs to the owner of 
the land’.149 It is necessary, for the process of accession to occur in Scots law, for the moveable 
                                                          
142 Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary, p.767 
143 (1899) 3 Adam 55n 
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to be physically attached to the heritage150 and for the moveable to be functionally subordinate 
to the land.151 As a corpse is placed in a grave in order to fulfil the purpose of the grave-site, 
the accessory may be said to be subordinate to the heritage; as the body is physically placed 
within the land, there is evidently sufficient attachment to effect accession.152 
It is consequently submitted that a corpse accedes to the land in which it is buried in 
Scots law, just as it did so under the Roman law. This accession leads to the creation of an 
object akin to a Romanistic res religiosa, even if the authorities concerned with the Scottish 
crime of violation of sepulchres do not make use of this term. Scots law does not require that 
the annexor or the landowner intended for the accession to be permanent in determining 
whether or not inaedificatio occurred,153 although in (almost)154 all circumstances in which the 
union is permanent in fact, accession can be said to have operated.155 In instances involving 
separable properties which have ostensibly acceded, as in South Africa,156 in modern Scots 
law, the question of whether or not inaedificatio has occurred depends greatly on the 
circumstances of each particular case.157 In general, inaedificatio is thought to occur in 
situations in which the fixture which accedes to the land could be said to have appeared to do 
so by onlookers.158 As it is presumed that all citizens are aware of their obligations under the 
law, and so can be presumed to know that interference with interred cadavers is the crime of 
                                                          
150 Reid, Property, para.580 
151 Reid, Property, para.581 
152 In the words of Professor Reid, ‘minimal attachment is sufficient’: Reid, Property, para.580. It is plain that 
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violation of sepulchres, it may be inferred that the interment of the body would be regarded as 
a fixture by any reasonable onlooker.  
The fact that the cadaver can be physically separated from the grave-site does not, 
therefore, negate the possibility of its having acceded to the grave for as long as it is interred. 
It is apparent that the burial of a corpse in a grave-site is intended to be a permanent 
arrangement. As the presence of the body in the land is necessary for the continued existence 
of any res religiosa, it can be inferred that the authorised removal of a cadaver caused that body 
to return to its previously profane state – by which, it is meant, the body may once again be the 
subject of theft, being that the crime of violation of sepulchres will not extend protection to 
bodies which are not buried in sepulchres. 
This analysis is relevant as ‘there is no authority dealing specifically with exhumed 
remains’159 and so it is not clear, in law, whether or not the appropriation of an exhumed 
cadaver ought to be subject to the law of theft or if the rules relating to the crime of violation 
of sepulchres irredeemably changed the character of the corpse on its interment. As noted in 
the introduction, Leverick and Chalmers suggested two possible legal outcomes arising out of 
the appropriation of an exhumed cadaver.160 They posit that the reason that the buried body is 
afforded protection, in law, by the crime of violation of sepulchres is that it has either, by burial, 
been abandoned, or it has simply become incapable of being owned altogether.161 If the former 
is to be regarded as the case, then the exhumed cadaver may, once it is no longer subject to 
protection by the crime of violation of sepulchres, once again be stolen; if the latter is to be 
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regarded as the case then the human body, once buried, is removed from the ambit of property 
law altogether on burial and so can never again be stolen.162 
 (2) The Appropriation of Exhumed Cadavers 
The attempts made by Leverick and Chalmers to explain the reason that the body, once interred, 
cannot be stolen are neither ethically, legally nor logically satisfactory. The first of their two 
suggestions – that the body is abandoned once it is buried – is legally and ethically 
unsatisfactory because nothing about funerary rites suggest abandonment;163 indeed, quite the 
opposite, given that reverential interment in a grave with a memorial stone serves to mark the 
memory of the deceased.164 Relying on the authority of Dewar v HM Advocate165 and Herron 
v Diack and Newlands,166 Leverick and Chalmers themselves note that ‘property is not 
abandoned… where a coffin is handed over for cremation or for burial at sea.’167 If the coffin 
is not abandoned as part of the funerary process, it appears incongruent to suggest that the body 
itself is. 
The suggestion that the cadaver is abandoned on burial is also logically and legally 
unsatisfactory since, if the body is to be regarded as abandoned on interment, then the maxim 
quod nullius est fit domini regis168 – everything that is ownerless falls to the Crown – would 
apply and so the body would be ‘owned’ by the Crown and so capable of being the subject of 
theft.169 While this suggestion would allow for the prosecution of those who appropriate 
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exhumed cadavers,170 it does not explain why the body cannot be stolen during its interment. 
If the cadaver is abandoned on burial, it would become the property of the Crown on burial and 
so be capable of being the subject of theft even while buried.  
The second of the two suggestions is unsatisfactory on a number of grounds and 
Leverick and Chalmers plainly posit that their proposition is ‘not free from difficulties’.171 If 
an exhumed cadaver is no longer capable of being owned, then it logically cannot be stolen and 
so all of the problems faced by English law by dint of its ‘no property’ rule172 would plague 
Scotland in respect of exhumed cadavers. In order to prosecute those who appropriate exhumed 
cadavers in such circumstances, the Scottish courts would be forced, like their English brethren, 
to make use of ‘creative judicial reasoning’173 which is anathema to the principle of legal 
certainty and the equitable operation of justice.174 Some additional problems with this 
proposition are raised when one considers the fact that, again, in any instance in which a body 
is lawfully exhumed, there will necessarily be persons who enjoy possessory rights to the 
cadaver.175 The existence of such possessory rights may, again, serve to allow for the 
presumption that the possessor is to be recognised as the ‘owner’, per Scots law. Even in the 
absence of this presumption, it would appear illogical to suggest that the body cannot be stolen, 
                                                          
170 Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26 
171 See Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4th Edition), para.21.26, note 160 
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being that dispossession of those who hold the exhumation warrant would necessarily amount 
to spuilzie.176 
The submission that interred cadavers are protected by the crime of violation of 
sepulchres due to an implicit recognition of the grave-site as a res religiosa circumvents these 
issues. The difficulty with the abandonment thesis is avoided since there is a justification as to 
why the body cannot be ‘stolen’ while it is interred and there is likewise no need to suggest 
that a reverential funeral may be equated with the simple abandonment of a piece of property. 
The problems with holding that a body, once buried, is simply and inexplicably removed from 
the ambit of ‘property law’ are likewise averted. If the grave-site is a res religiosa, but the 
constituent parts of the res religiosa are profane and so subject to the laws of property, then it 
follows that, notwithstanding the fact that the body and grave-site cease to be governed by the 
ordinary laws of property while a cadaver is interred within, the law must necessarily recognise 
that exhumed cadavers can be stolen as the removal of a body from a res religiosa means that 
the locus religiosus ceases to be a res religiosa. Both corpse and grave, in such circumstances, 
are once again regulated by the ordinary rules of property.  
Prior to burial, certain relevant persons are granted the right to possess the corpse to 
ensure its burial.177 As cadavers can be stolen before the burial occurs, it may be presumed that 
the possessor is, until the time of burial, the owner of the body.178 Once the body is buried, 
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there is no enduring right of possession, although there may be persons with ius sepulcri in 
respect of the grave.179 Such ius sepulcri does not, however, imply either ownership or legal 
possession; merely the ability to authorise decisions in respect of the grave-site. If a body is 
lawfully exhumed, then, once again, certain relevant persons will be granted the right to possess 
the body to ensure its re-burial or cremation elsewhere. Once again, it may be presumed that 
such persons are the ‘owners’ of the corpse for the purposes of criminal law and thus for the 
purposes of the law of theft. On this analysis, exhumed cadavers – and those dead bodies which 
are stored in locales other than grave-sites – can be ‘stolen’, in law as well as in fact, but there 
exists a justification as to why they cannot be stolen during their interment.  
D. CONCLUSION 
From the above, it is apparent that the crime of violation of sepulchres – as derived from the 
Roman crimen violati sepulcri – implies the existence of res religiosae within Scots law. The 
crimen violati sepulcri existed, in Roman law, to protect the integrity of grave-sites. In that 
legal system, all grave-sites were regarded as res religiosae and so were not subject to the 
ordinary rules of the ius quod ad res pertinet. Such things were consigned to the divini iuris, 
rather than the humani iuris. While a body was buried, it was not possible to raise a private 
action for theft if it were stolen, however the crimen violati sepulcri – as an actio popularis – 
allowed any private citizen to accuse an individual who purportedly interfered with a res 
religiosa. Individuals may have enjoyed ius sepulcri over the grave-site, but this did not grant 
dominium or imply ius disponendi; rather, it simply allowed the holder of the ius to lawfully 
exhume the bodies contained in the graves, or to raise a specific actio violati sepulcri in the 
event of unauthorised interference or removal. 
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 The Scottish crime of violation of sepulchres evidently derives – in substance and in 
root – from the Roman crimen violati sepulcri. It is notable that the (reported) Scottish cases 
which deal directly with this crime, and those commentators who deigned to mention the crime 
throughout the 19th century, made use of the Latin phrase in describing the criminal act. The 
operation of the Scottish crime of violation of sepulchres remains comparable, in all material 
respects, to the operation of the Roman crimen violati sepulcri. In spite of the reluctance of 
post-Reformation Scots law to recognise res sacrae or res sanctae, the nature of the continued 
existence of the crime of violation of sepulchres implies a recognition of res religiosae, as 
bodies, prior to burial, may be stolen in this jurisdiction – so distinguishing Scots law from 
English law, wherein a general ‘no property’ rule operates – yet on burial even a very minor 
interference with the interred cadaver will incur criminal sanction.   
Just as the creation of res religiosae could be explained by the operation of accessio – 
specifically inaedificatio – in Roman law, so too can the creation of a comparable Scottish res 
religiosa be explained by the operation of accession in Scots law. The pertinent Roman rules 
relating to accessio were received into Scots law during the institutional period and, though 
there are some differences between the Scottish understanding of the doctrine and the Roman 
law, under both systems it is evident that the moveable cadaver accedes as a fixture to the 
immoveable grave-site. The removal of the body, in both systems, destroys the res religiosa; 
in such circumstances, the constituent elements of the res religiosa return to their previous 
state, meaning that they are subject to the caprices of the ordinary law of property once more. 
This analysis provides a satisfactory explanation as to why a dead body can be the 
subject of theft prior to burial, but cannot be stolen once it has been buried in Scots law. The 
analysis is, it is submitted, to be preferred to the other possibilities which have been put forward 
by other legal commentators. The suggestion that burying a dead body is akin to abandonment 
is unsatisfactory on both moral and legal grounds; on moral grounds, since most people would 
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likely be unhappy with the suggestion that they abandoned their relatives in burying them, on 
legal grounds as the law relating to abandonment does not explain why the corpse cannot be 
stolen while it is interred. Similarly, to hold that a dead body simply ceases to be an object of 
‘property’ altogether on burial is not rationally satisfactory, since that would give rise to the 
same problems faced by English law as a result of its operative ‘no property’ rule. As indicated, 
the ‘no property’ rule undermines legal certainty and allows for the commission of ‘peculiarly 
indecent’180 thefts to go unpunished on grounds of a simple legal technicality. 
In addition, it is submitted that the alternative explanation of the law surrounding res 
religiosae functionally explains the absence of ‘property’ in buried bodies, thus providing a 
logical basis for the proposition that an unburied body may be stolen, but a buried body may 
not. On this basis alone, it may be concluded that the analysis provided in this article is to be 
preferred to the suggestions of abandonment or a complete lack of ‘property’ after the discharge 
of burial duties; when this fact is combined with a recognition of the problems presented by 
the alternative analyses, the suggestion that the logic of the crime of violation of sepulchres 
can be explained by reference to its Roman law progenitor garners greater currency still. 
With that said, the suggestion that Scots law yet recognises res religiosae is not likely 
to be uncontroversial. The overtly religious overtones of the term and its history may be thought 
of as incongruent in an increasingly secular – and increasingly irreligious – society. 
Nevertheless, however unpalatable the acceptance of a phrase like ‘res religiosae’ may be to 
secularists, without an understanding of the history of that term, and the connection that this 
history enjoys with respect to the operation of contemporary law, the law cannot move forward. 
Instances of violation of sepulchres – and instances concerning the unlawful appropriation of 
cadavers – may be (thankfully) rare, but that is no justification for the neglect of the theoretical 
                                                          
180 See, again, R v Stephen (1884) 12 QBD 247, at p.252 
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framework of this aspect of the criminal law. It is therefore to be hoped that, with the relevant 
rules of law now having been set out, a debate as to how best to protect dead bodies from 
unauthorised or unlawful interference may begin in earnest.  
